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ARTICLES
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE ANALYSIS: A LIBERTY
MAXIMIZING PROPOSAL
RODNEY K. SMITH*
As we approach the two hundredth anniversaries of the
adoption and ratification of the first amendment, we continue
to grapple with the meaning or legal import of the religion pro-
vision of the first amendment. That provision provides that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... 1" Those
sixteen words, which were framed to evidence an intent to aid
in securing some form of religious liberty, present an interpre-
tive challenge that has intensified rather than abated over the
years.
Much has been written of late regarding the difficulty of
interpreting the language of the Constitution, which is natu-
rally ambiguous.2 James Madison, the author of the first
* Dean and Professor of Law, Capital University Law and Graduate
Center; J.D. 1977, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University;
LL.M. 1982 and S.J.D. 1989, University of Pennsylvania.
In addition to his presentation of this paper at the Notre Dame Law
School, the author also presented portions of this article at Drake University
and at the University of San Diego and acknowledges the helpful comments
he received from members of those law school faculties.
1. U.S. CONST. amend I.
2. See, e.g., J. GARVEY & T. ALEINIKOFF, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL
THEORY: A READER 28-84 (1989); Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution:
Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843
(1978); Simon, The Authority of the Framers of the Constitution: Can Originalist
Interpretation Be Justified?, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1482 (1985). Even Judge Bork
recognized this fact in his statement before the Senate Judiciary Committee,
when he noted:
When the words [of the Constitution] are general, as is the case with
some of the most profound protections of our liberties in the Bill of
Rights and the Civil War amendments, the task is far more
complex-it is to find the principle or value that was intended to be
protected and see that it is protected.
Nomination of Robert H. Bork: Hearings Before the Committee on theJudiciary, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. 107 (1987).
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amendment,3 recognized this difficulty. In acknowledging the
challenge the members of the constitutional convention faced
in "delineating the boundary between federal and State juris-
dictions," Madison noted:
All new laws, though penned with the greatest skill and
passed on the fullest and most mature deliberation, are
considered as more or less obscure and equivocal, until
their meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series of
particular discussions and adjudications. Besides the
obscurity arising from the complexity of objects and the
imperfection of the human faculties, the medium through
which the conceptions of men are conveyed to each other
adds a fresh embarrassment. The use of words is to
express ideas. Perspicuity, therefore, requires not only
that the ideas should be distinctly formed, but that they
should be expressed by words distinctly and exclusively
appropriate to them. But no language is so copious as to
supply words and phrases for every complex idea, or so
correct as not to include many equivocally denoting dif-
ferent ideas. Hence it must happen that however accu-
rately objects may be discriminated in themselves, and
however accurately the discrimination may be consid-
ered, the definition of them may be rendered inaccurate
by the inaccuracy of the terms in which it is delivered.
And this unavoidable inaccuracy must be greater or less,
according to the complexity and novelty of the objects
defined. When the Almighty himself condescends to
address mankind in their own language, his meaning,
luminous as it must be, is rendered dim and doubtful by
the cloudy medium through which it is communicated.4
If the ideas that were to give our federal and state jurisdictions
meaning presented such a perplexing interpretive challenge, it
is clear that the sixteen words used to delineate the contours of
the idea of religious liberty in the new republic must have been
acknowledged to present a challenge of virtually unprece-
dented magnitude. The interpretive odyssey of the Supreme
Court, in giving meaning to the religion provision, has ren-
dered Madison's words prophetic. Involved as we are in con-
3. On June 7, 1789, James Madison introduced the Bill of Rights,
including the first amendment, in the First Congress. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 451
(J. Gales ed. 1789). While the text of the first amendment was altered after its
introduction, Madison continues to be considered the "author" of the
amendment. See, e.g., R. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS: 1776-
1791, 196-200 (1969).
4. THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 229 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
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tinuing to "liquidate and ascertain" the meaning of the religion
clauses through "discussions and adjudications," I recognize
that each contribution to this symposium at most can be but a
contribution to the dialogue or discussion that has imbued the
religion provision with meaning since its penning some two
hundred years ago.
Recognizing the limits of language, and having been hum-
bled in my own pursuit of the ideas that give meaning to the
framers' call for religious liberty, 5 I offer my present contribu-
tion to the dialogue regarding the meaning of the establish-
ment clause of the first amendment. My contribution to the
dialogue, in the form of this article, will be divided into three
major parts.
In part I, I challenge what has come to be the predominant
view regarding original intent analysis.6 The proponents of
this view essentially argue that when the text of the Constitu-
tion, coupled with contemporaneous indicia of intent,7 are
unclear or ambiguous, the Court should defer to the judgments
or decisions of the legislature and the executive-the demo-
cratically elected branches of our government-in order to
ascertain the scope and meaning of provisions of the Constitu-
tion, including the religion provision.' Proponents of this
5. As one begins to delve into the historical record to ascertain the
intentions of the framers and ratifiers of the first amendment, it becomes
evident that their intentions were often broad and vaguely expressed. For my
own effort to glean the historical intent of the framers and r'atifiers of the
religion clauses, see R. SMITH, PUBLIC PRAYER AND THE CONSTITUTION: A
CASE STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1987).
6. The "originalist" views of deferentialists like Robert Bork, Edwin
Meese, Lino Graglia, Henry Monaghan and Raoul Berger have tended to
dominate, and even preempt, what has come to be considered interpretivism
or originalism.
7. By contemporaneous indicia of intent, they generally refer to specific
policy choices made by political bodies or officers during the era
contemporaneous with the framing and ratification of the constitutional
provision at issue. For example, they might well ask whether the framers and
ratifiers permitted a certain public prayer practice during the era
contemporaneous with the framing and ratifying of the first amendment.
8. When evidence of intent, either in the form of explicit language that
clearly resolves a specific problem or evidence of specific actions or
contemporaneous indicia of intent that demonstrate how the framers and
ratifiers actually resolved a particular issue, is lacking, these originalists urge
judicial restraint and deference to the democratic branches of government in
resolving constitutional issues. See, e.g., Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First
Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 10-11 (1971); Rehnquist, The Notion of a
Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REV. 693, 699 (1976). In his confirmation
hearings, Judge Bork backed off from this very deferential position somewhat
by recognizing that, particularly in the case of the Bill of Rights, the Court
1990]
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largely deferential view of original intent claim that it properly
restrains the Court, and thereby constitutes the most legitimate
and restrained mode of judicial review. In responding to that
position, I will argue that such a view either reflects a misun-
derstanding or a misrepresentation of the intent of the framers
and ratifiers. Securing liberty, while insuring a modicum of
order, was primary among the hierarchy of values or ideas that
the framers sought to enshrine in the Constitution. The defer-
ential originalist view disregards the framers' and ratifiers'
desire to maximize liberty.
In part II, I delineate the views of the framers regarding
the establishment clause. In doing so, I rely on, without
repeating in detail, the results and conclusions I have drawn in
a previous work.9 In part II, I also examine each of those views
to ascertain which one, or which combination of views, maxi-
mizes religious liberty. Part III is a brief summary and
conclusion.
I. ORIGINAL INTENT - EFFECTUATING THE LIBERTARIAN
ASPIRATIONS OF THE FRAMERS
Originalists, those who attribute dispositive force to the
intent of the framers and ratifiers in interpreting constitutional
provisions, necessarily take the constitutional text, history con-
temporaneous with the framing and ratification of the Constitu-
tion, and the structure of our government very seriously for the
purposes of constitutional analysis.' °  Originalists examine
objective, public indicia of intent, but they disregard undis-
closed, subjective intentions in determining the likely meaning
of a constitutional provision. Undisclosed, subjective inten-
tions are largely irrelevant in originalist analysis, because those
undisclosed intentions were not used to influence the ratifica-
tion of the constitutional provision. Since no constitutional
provision is effective without being ratified, only those state-
ments or indicia of intent that influence the ratification process
must often seek to ascertain what broad principles the framers were trying to
effectuate in drafting, adopting and ratifying a general provision. Bork, supra
note 2, at 106-11. Nevertheless, when a judge is unable to ascertain what
broad principle the framers and ratifiers intended or when such historical
analysis discloses various views, deferential originalists, including Bork, defer
to democratic institutions in giving meaning and effect to those provisions.
This, as I will argue in this article, is contrary to the overriding libertarian
aspirations of the framers and ratifiers.
9. R. SMITH, supra note 5, at 15-120.
10. See, e.g., Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88
COL. L. REV. 723, 723-27 (1988).
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should be considered. Public statements made during the
adoption process, however, are significant, because it may be
assumed that those statements or similar ones influenced the
public debate and the ratification process. The text of the pro-
vision itself, and its fit in our constitutional structure, coupled
with public statements made to influence the debate over and
ratification of the provision at issue and actual contemporane-
ous actions related to the issues covered by a given provision,
are critical in ascertaining the meaning of the provision."
Undisclosed intentions are not.
I believe all originalists, myself included, agree that text,
objective, contemporaneous history and constitutional struc-
ture are necessary ingredients in originalist analysis. However,
the analysis of those sources often produces an equivocal rec-
ord at best. Text, history and structure are rarely dispositive of
specific issues. Indeed, along with others, I have noted that
these sources generally yield little more than the perimeters
within which the interpretive endeavor must operate to main-
tain fidelity to the original intent. 2 As such, originalism sel-
dom yields specific answers to concrete questions, and one
must acknowledge that there is a need to interpose or apply a
second theory of constitutional interpretation in order to select
from among the interpretive choices or possibilities that fall
within the perimeter delineated by an originalist examination
of text, history and structure.
This insight, that originalists need a second theory to
enable them to decide among the various interpretive choices
yielded as a result of their examination of text, history and
structure, should hardly be surprising to anyone who has been
11. Id. at 725.
12. I believe Professor Van Alystyne said it well when he noted:
Ordinary judicial conscientiousness in respect to interpretations of
our Constitution cuts both ways. It certainly does mean that the
boundaries are to be respected, but there is no reason to take this as
counsel of despair. The words of the Constitution are instructive.
They do impose constraints, equally upon courts as upon other
agencies of the government. Yet one's own reading ought not to be
close-minded or premature. History, moreover, is germane in a
more confining way. Quite frequently what it yields is heavily
dependent upon the premises of its users-which may be far too
narrow or wizened, rather than too wishful. More often than one
might suppose, one may be surprised that what was first doubtful in
respect to the manner in which a given clause or combination of
clauses might be applicable to a particular case, is not a puzzle after
all.
Van Alstyne, Interpreting the Constitution: The Unhelpful Contributions of Special
Theories of Judicial Review, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 209, 234 (1984).
1990]
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involved in the legislative enterprise. As the quote from
Madison in the introduction to this article indicates, language is
necessarily ambiguous, in that it often necessarily reflects com-
plex ideas incompletely. Furthermore, legislators frequently
use this very ambiguity of language to mask or compromise
their disagreement regarding the underlying issues or ideas
covered by the text of their legislation. The very ambiguity of
language often serves as a weapon in the hands of a legislator-
by using ambiguous language, the legislator is able to reach a
compromise with those with whom she is not in full agreement.
The particularly able legislator can reach a compromise by
using general, somewhat ambiguous language, while recogniz-
ing that such language offers interpretive flexibility. Such flexi-
bility affords future executive or judicial implementors of the
legislation the opportunity to make choices from among an
array of legitimate interpretive possibilities. Indeed, I would
argue that many of the framers, including Madison, understood
this principle and used it effectively.' 3 Madison and the fram-
ers were children of the Enlightenment, and believed that the
Constitution-making process was one of setting ideas in
motion-ideas in embryo, the fruition of which was to come
through future "discussion and adjudication."' 4 For them, the
Constitution-making process was a process in which they cap-
tured their ideas in words that offered sufficient latitude for
future, fuller development of those ideas. Similarly, they rec-
ognized, as Hamilton noted in Federalist No. 84, in which he
argued against including a written Bill of Rights in the Consti-
tution, that words could be read or interpreted and applied in a
constraining manner as well.' 5 This interpretive dilemma or
13. In introducing and shepherding the Bill of Rights through the First
Congress, Madison understood the urgency of getting the Bill of Rights
adopted promptly to avoid antifederalist efforts to dismantle the
Constitution. See R. SMITH, supra note 5, at 74-79. Given Madison's
recognition of this urgency, it would seem fair to conclude that Madison was
willing to use and accept broad language to compromise or otherwise mask
specific disagreements among the framers.
14. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
15. In this regard, in opposing the inclusion of a Bill of Rights in the
Constitution on the ground that language necessarily serves a limiting
function, Hamilton noted:
I go further and affirm that bills of rights, in the sense and to the
extent in which they are contended for, are not only unnecessary in
the proposed Constitution but would even be dangerous. They
would contain various exceptions to powers which are not granted:
and, on this very account, would afford a colorable pretext to claim
more than were granted. For why declare that things shall not be
done which there is no power to do? Why, for instance, should it be
A LIBERTY MAXIMIZING ANALYSIS
paradox regarding language - that language could give devel-
oping life to an idea or could be used to constrain that very
idea - was one the framers no doubt were painfully aware of.
My disagreement with deferential originalists-Judge Bork,
former Attorney General Meese and Professors Monaghan,
Graglia, and Berger, among others-reflects this dilemma fac-
ing the framers in their effort to put their ideas regarding lib-
erty into written form.
Deferential originalists use the ambiguity of the text and
the history of the Bill of Rights to constrain the vision or aspi-
ration of liberty held by many of the framers. Deferential
originalists examine the text, history and structure of the Bill of
Rights to ascertain whether those sources resolve specific
issues. Not surprisingly, it is exceedingly rare to find that those
sources yield specific interpretive answers to specific questions.
The framers of the Constitution, the Bill of Rights and the Civil
Rights Amendments largely were natural lawyers, who
espoused broad principles and often eschewed the call to
resolve specific issues in a specific manner within the Constitu-
tion.' 6 Rather than seeking to find and apply broad principles,
however, deferential originalists use the ambiguity that appears
in the text, history and structure of the Constitution to warrant
recourse to their second, non-originalist theory, that of defer-
ence to the legislative and executive branches. When deferen-
tial originalists are unable to discover specific evidence
sufficient to resolve clearly the particular issue before them,
they provide the elected branches of government with license
to effectuate policies adopted in the democratic process. In
doing so, they minimize constitutional constraints on the
actions of the legislative and executive branches.
said that the liberty of the press shall not be restrained, when no
power is given by which restrictions may be composed? I will not
contend that such a provision would confer a regulating power; but
it is evident that it would furnish, to men disposed to usurp, a
plausible pretense for claiming that power. They might urge with a
semblance of reason that the Constitution ought not to be charged
with the absurdity of providing against the abuse of an authority
which was not given, and the provision against restraining the liberty
of the press afforded a clear implication that a power to prescribe
proper regulations concerning it was intended to be vested in the
national government. This may serve as a specimen of the
numerous handles which would be given to the doctrine of
constructive powers, by the indulgence of an injudicious zeal for
bills of rights,
THE FEDERALIST No. 84, supra note 4, at 513-14.
16. See Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.
1127 (1987).
1990]
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Deferential originalists contend further that such defer-
ence to the majoritarian branches legitimizes their methodol-
ogy. In essence, they argue that when their originalist analysis
yields specific answers, it is supported by the force of a super-
majoritarian agreement, as evidenced in the ratification pro-
cess. In other words, they assert that since the constitutional
provision at issue was adopted and ratified by a super-majority,
their specific findings relative to that intent are likewise sup-
ported by a super-majority. As such, absent an amendment,
their specific interpretation should not be overruled by a mere
legislative or executive majority. However, when their original-
ist analysis fails to yield a clear-cut, specific answer, they assert
that they should exercise restraint and permit existing legisla-
tive or executive majorities, at the state or federal level, to
decide the issue, without judicial intervention.
There are numerous problems with such a deferential
originalist theory. On its own terms, such a theory fails to com-
mand super-majority support. The framers and ratifiers sel-
dom, if ever, thought in terms of sufficient specificity to yield
clear-cut, specific answers. For example, during the course of
debates over the religion clauses, the framers and ratifiers did
not discuss whether their language was susceptible to an inter-
pretation that would permit the government to compose
prayers for public recitation. Certainly they did talk of princi-
ples that might assist one in deciding such issues, but those
principles were broad and somewhat ambiguous.' 7 Indeed,
what the super-majority agreed to was a broad principle or set
of sometimes competing principles, reflected in necessarily
ambiguous language.' 8 Thus, when deferential originalists
limit their originalist enterprise to the discovery of specific
answers to specific questions, they disregard the broad intent
of the framers and ratifiers. Therefore, their second,
nonoriginalist theory of deference to legislative and executive
majorities overrides their originalist theory or methodology as
to virtually every significant constitutional issue. Their theory
is predominantly a theory of deference to the democratic
branches of government, not a theory of original intent.
While the deferential originalists' theory of democratic
government has much to commend it, as a theory that restrains
the nonelected judiciary, it is not really originalist in its empha-
sis nor is it in keeping with the intent and aspirations of the
framers and ratifiers. As noted previously, the framers and
17. R. SMITH, supra note 5, at 73-106.
18. Id.
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ratifiers were largely natural lawyers, thinking in terms of broad
and sometimes competing natural law principles. Thus, when
deferential originalists examine the text, history and structure
of the Constitution in what I might refer to as a piecemeal, pos-
itivistic manner,' 9 they impose a twentieth century mindset on
a document penned in a different era. Certainly, any time we
attempt to analyze a different era, we can fall prey to the urge
to filter that history through our own lens or mindset. How-
ever, deferential originalists seemingly fail to recognize this
fact, or simply choose to ignore it, recognizing (I suspect) that
their view is not so much an originalist theory as it is a theory of
democratic government and judicial restraint.
Even more significantly, however, deferential originalists
disregard the libertarian aspirations of the framers and ratifiers
in their rush to impose their second, deferential theory ofjudi-
cial restraint. My research regarding the framing era reveals
that the. framers largely sought to maximize liberty, while pro-
viding for a modicum of order.20 I am not alone in reaching
19. The framers thought in terms of broad principles. Contemporary
positivists, on the other hand, believe that the law performs the function of
providing specific answers to specific questions. See Soper, Making Sense of
Modern Jurisprudence: The Paradox of Positivism and the Challenge for Natural Law,
22 CREIGHTON L. REV. 67 (1989).
20. For example, Madison's proposal for dealing with religious
freedom, which he introduced to be considered for possible inclusion in the
Virginia Declaration of Rights, provided:
That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the
manner of discharging it, being under the direction of reason and
conviction only, not of violence, or compulsion, all men are entitled
to the full and free exercise of it according to the dictates of
conscience; and therefore no man or class of men ought on account
of religion be invested with particular emoluments or privileges, nor
subjected to any penalties or disabilities, unless under the color of
religion the preservation of equal liberty, and the existence of the State
be manifestly endangered.
Quoted in R. SMITH, supra note 5, at 39 (emphasis added). Indeed, my research
regarding the intent of the framers relative to the religion clauses largely
revealed a sensitivity for liberty on the part of the framers, subject only to a
desire to preserve the equal liberty of others and the public good or order.
In FEDERALIST No. 37 Madison recognized the tension between liberty, which
he noted was "inviolable," and "stability and energy in government," which
he opined to be "essential to that security against external and internal dan-
ger." THE FEDERALIST, No. 37, supra note 4, at 226. Madison went on to
argue that energy and stability in government were essential to maintain and
protect republican liberty. Id. at 226-27. Indeed, Hamilton argued that, "the
vigor of government is essential to the security of liberty; that, in the contem-
plation of a sound and well-informed judgment, their interests can never be
separated.. " THE FEDERALIST, No. 1, supra note 4, at 35. Thus, vigor in
government itself existed to secure liberty.
19901
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such a conclusion. Forrest McDonald probably said it best,
when he noted that the Constitution "is a body of law,
designed to govern not people, but government itself."' 2 ' Def-
erential originalists effectively turn this notion on its head,
using the generality and breadth of the historical record as an
excuse to expand the power of government in the area of civil
liberties.
The framers and ratifiers sought to maximize liberty on
every front, enshrining liberty as the primary value in their
hierarchy of values. The primacy of liberty found its way into
their conception of the institutions and structures of govern-
ment, as well as into the Bill of Rights itself.
For example, even the nationalization of power under the
Constitution was intended as a means of limiting the power of
government overall, and of increasing or maintaining liberty in
the process. In the words of Forrest McDonald:
The members of the Great Convention sought to reestab-
lish limits upon government and restore it to the rule of
law. Fully twenty percent of the body of the Constitution
is devoted to specifying things that government (state
and/or federal) may not do. By contrast, only eleven per-
cent of the text is concerned with positive grants of
power. Of the powers granted, most were already vested
in the old Confederation Congress, and of the ten new
powers, all had previously been exercised by the states.
Consequently, the sum total of powers that could thence-
forth be legitimately exercised was reduced, not
enlarged.22
Thus, the framers' concern with regard to the rule of law and
the preservation of liberty was manifested in a document that
lessened the power of government as a whole.
Even the national democracy, our democratic republic, was
founded less as a means of effectuating democracy and more as
a means of securing liberty. Conceding that participation in
our democracy is itself a species of liberty23 which helps to pro-
tect liberty as a whole, it should be remembered that demo-
21. F. McDONALD, THE INTELLECTUAL WORLD OF THE FOUNDING
FATHERS, at 19, 16th Jefferson Lecture in the Humanities, National
Endowment for the Humanities, May 6, 1987.
22. Id.
23. Some commentators and historians have argued that participation
in our democratic institutions is the primary or even exclusive constitutional
protection of liberty. See, e.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); W.
NELSON AND R. PALMER, LIBERTY AND COMMUNITY: CONSTITUTION AND RIGHTS
IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC (1987).
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cratic participation is not the end in itself-liberty is. In
Federalist No. 10, Madison argued that, despite the fact that
liberty gives rise to faction, faction is essential to political life. 24
He asserted that the threat of a single faction commanding a
continuing majority such that it might tyrannize minorities is
significantly lessened at the national level. He added that a
national democratic republic has the further virtue of
restraining the excesses of faction without limiting liberty. He
concluded by asserting that:
[I]t clearly appears that the same advantage which a
republic has over a democracy in controlling the effects
of faction is enjoyed by a large over a small republic-is
enjoyed by the Union over the States composing it. Does
this advantage consist in the substitution of representa-
tives whose enlightened views and virtuous sentiments
render them superior to local prejudices and to schemes
of injustice? It will not be denied that the representation
of the Union will be most likely to possess these requisite
endowments. Does it consist in the greater security
afforded by a greater variety of parties, against the event
of any one party being able to outnumber and oppress
the rest? In an equal degree does the increased variety of
parties comprised within the Union increase this secur-
ity? Does it, in fine, consist in the greater obstacles
opposed to the concert and accomplishment of the secret
wishes of an unjust and interested majority? Here again
the extent of the Union gives it the most palpable
advantage.25
Deferential originalists are content to use democracy, at
the state and national levels, to limit liberty. Ironically, they
assert that they must exercise restraint because our representa-
tive democracy is the primary protector of individual liberty,
even when the representative branches of government limit lib-
erty in an individual case. As such, their theory is much more
one of judicial restraint than one of liberty. In arguing for the
ratification of the Constitution, Madison, on the other hand,
clearly noted that our democratic republic was designed to
serve liberty, not vice versa, as the deferential originalists
contend.
A close reading of Federalist Nos. 47, 51, 62 and 63 illus-
trates, for example, that the purpose of bicameralism and the
separation of powers was to help secure liberty. The framers
24. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 4, at 77-84.
25. Id. at 83-84.
1990]
474 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 4
built inefficiency into our political structure to inhibit the
power of transitory majorities to tyrannize minorities. In Fed-
eralist No. 47, responding to the claim that shared powers
among the branches of the federal government might expand
governmental power and restrict liberty, Madison opined that:
No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value, or
is stamped with the authority of more enlightened
patrons of liberty than that on which the objection is
founded. The accumulation of all powers, legislative,
executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of
one, a few or many, and whether hereditary, self-
appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the
very definition of tyranny. Were the federal Constitution,
therefore, really chargeable with this accumulation of
power, or with a mixture of powers, having a dangerous
tendency to such an accumulation, no further arguments
would be necessary to inspire a universal reprobation of
the system. I persuade myself, however, that it will be
apparent to everyone that the charge cannot be sup-
ported, and that the maxim on which it relies has been
totally misconceived and misapplied.2 6
Again, in Federalist No. 51, introducing a brief discussion of
bicameralism, and writing generally about divided powers,
Madison stressed that:
The policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests,
the defect of better motives, might be traced through the
whole system of human affairs, private as well as public.
We see it particularly displayed in all the subordinate dis-
tribution of power, where the constant aim is to divide
and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that
each may be a check on the other-that the private inter-
est of every individual may be a sentinel over the public
rights.2
7
Fear of tyranny, particularly legislative tyranny,
predominated in the writings of the proponents of the Consti-
tution. Deferential originalists have turned this proposition on
its head. They take the general, broad language of the Consti-
tution and use it as a means to increase legislative power, such
that the public interest prevails over individual interests and
rights.
26. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 4, at 301.
27. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 4, at 322.
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Even federalism, the division of power between the
national and state governments, was designed to limit govern-
mental power and preserve liberty. In this regard, in Federalist
No. 55, Madison again argued that he was "unable to conceive
that the State legislatures, which must feel so many motives to
watch and which possess so many means of counteracting the
federal legislature, would fail either to detect or to defeat a
conspiracy of the latter against the liberties of their common
constituents. 28
Finally, even if one were disposed to argue that the institu-
tions and structure of the government provided for in the Con-
stitution either were sufficient to protect liberty without judicial
intervention or were not created to protect liberty, but were
created to further democracy and other values apart from lib-
erty, the existence of a Bill or Rights stands as significant evi-
dence that the framers and ratifiers ultimately were concerned
with the issue of preserving and extending liberty. The argu-
ment that liberty predominated in the constitutional fabric was
made by James Wilson andJames Madison, and is strengthened
further by Alexander Hamilton's comments in Federalist No.
84, where he asserted: "The truth is, after all the declamations
we have heard, that the Constitution is itself in every rational
sense, and to every useful purpose, a BILL OF RIGHTS." '29
Indeed, Hamilton feared that the very ambiguity that would
attend the drafting of a Bill of Rights might imply that the
elected government had powers not granted to it-powers that
would enable it to infringe upon individual liberty. In Hamil-
ton's words:
I go further and affirm that bills of rights, in the sense
and to the extent in which they are contended for, are not
only unnecessary in the proposed Constitution but would
even be dangerous. They would contain various excep-
tions to powers which are not granted; and, on this very
account, would afford a colorable pretext to claim more
than were granted. For why declare that things should
not be done which there is no power to do? Why, for
instance, should it be said that the liberty of the press
shall not be restrained, when no power is given by which
restrictions may be imposed?3"
Despite these protestations on the part of Hamilton and
others, the people through their representatives in the state
28. THE FEDERALIST No. 55, supra note 4, at 344.
29. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, supra note 4, at 515.
30. Id. at 513-14.
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ratifying conventions insisted that a Bill of Rights be added to
the Constitution.' In fact, despite having made arguments
similar to those offered in Federalist No. 84 by Hamilton,
Madison changed his mind and agreed to sponsor a Bill of
Rights if he was elected to the House of Representatives.2
Thus, for example, the ninth amendment must be read in light
of Madison's and Hamilton's fear that putting a Bill of Rights
into writing might somehow be viewed as giving elected offi-
cials the power to limit such rights, by reading them
restrictively. 3
3
Given the clear natural law and libertarian intentions or
aspirations of the framers, deferential originalists are more true
to their political philosophy of judicial restraint and deference
to democratic institutions than they are to the intentions or
aspirations of the framers. They unduly constrain constitu-
tional principles, which were intended to constitute broad artic-
ulations of liberty, in order that they might defer to legislative
and executive power. In this process, deferential originalists
disregard history and disparage the libertarian aspirations of
the framers and ratifiers.
Given the errors of deferential originalists, what is an
originalist to do? Does the very breadth of constitutional prin-
ciples and the indeterminacy of the concept of liberty render
originalist analysis meaningless? I think not. But one must
rehabilitate originalism in light of the breadth of constitutional
principles and the generality of language used by the framers
and in light of the somewhat indeterminate concept of liberty3 4
31. See R. SMITH, supra note 5, at 73-75.
32. See id. at 75 and R. RUTLAND, supra note 3, at 196-200.
33. See Caplan, The History and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 69 VA. L.
REV. 223, 238-59 (1983). The Ninth Amendment provides that: "The
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
34. It is conceded that the term "liberty" itself is indeterminate and
difficult to define. Indeed, much has been written regarding what may have
been intended by the framers and those of their generation when they
referred to "liberty" and "rights." See, e.g., J.P. REID, CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS (1986);
W. NELSON & R. PALMER, supra note 23. However, I would assert that such
"liberty" is twofold: (1) It consists of the "political privileges of the citizens
in the structure and administration of the government." See THE FEDERALIST,
No. 84, supra note 4, at 515 (This facet of liberty encompasses the right of
citizens to participate in the institutions of their democratic republic); and (2)
it also consists of "immunities" - the right of the people to be free from
government intrusion in matters of "personal and private concern . I. " d.
(this immunity of individuals from government intrusion into matter of
private or personal concern arguably is the focus of the Bill of Rights-a
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that imbued those principles with an overriding sense of
purpose.
With such limitations in mind, I offer a less deferential the-
ory of originalism. My reading of the history of the religion
clauses in particular leads me to believe that the framers and
ratifiers used and accepted broad language both to mask or
minimize existing disagreement and to set in motion broad
principles of religious liberty. Elsewhere, I have argued that
the perimeters of religious liberty that were established when
the framing of the religion clauses occurred are set by what I
have referred to as the Madisonian and Story views." While
these views differ and are occasionally competing, they are not
limitless. The perimeters, to borrow an image suggested by
Professor Schauer, provide one with a canvas upon which to
paint, or interpret.3 6 There are matters that are, in my view,
plainly off the canvas. For example, at the one extreme, it is
clear that the intent of the framers and ratifiers of the first
amendment precludes the establishment of a national religion.
At the other extreme, it is also clear that this intent precludes a
strict or complete separation of church and state.3 7 Neverthe-
less, while some matters are clearly outside the perimeters
gleaned from a comprehensive originalist analysis, the choices
within the perimeters are numerous and occasionally conflict-
ing. How, then, is one to choose, in the interpretive endeavor,
from among tenable alternatives?
In my view, rather than deferring to the legislature, or to
democratic institutions, in deciding among the various alterna-
tives derived in an originalist analysis, a judge should seek to
maximize liberty where possible. Under such a theory, the
document penned to ensure that the government would not intrude into such
areas). Thus, for the purposes of this article, much of the focus will be on the
right of individuals and groups to be free from government regulation in the
area of religious liberty, the focus of the religion provision of the first
amendment. Deferential originalists seem to ignore or severely limit the role
of the judiciary in maintaining such community and liberty, despite
Hamilton's statement that, "courts of justice are to be considered as the
bulwarks of a limited Constitution against legislative encroachments
[encroachments by democratic institutions on personal or private rights]..."
THE FEDERALIST, No. 78, supra note 4. In Federalist No. 78, Hamilton goes
on to argue that the members of judiciary need to be independent and to
hold life tenure. Independence and life tenure were deemed to be "essential
to the faithful performance of so arduous a duty [the duty of securing
personal and private liberty]." Id.
35. See R. SMITH, supra note 5, at 37-120.
36. Schauer, An Essay on Constitutional Language, 29 UCLA L. REv. 797,
828 (1982).
37. See R. SMITH, supra note 5, at 73-132.
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courts may expand individual liberty, where to do so does not
otherwise unduly jeopardize the equal liberty of another.38 But
the judiciary may not restrict efforts by the legislature or demo-
cratic institutions to maximize or facilitate liberty unless those
legislative efforts are clearly outside the perimeters disclosed
by originalist analysis. Such a view is consistent both with the
framers' and ratifiers' intentions (in that one accepts the perim-
eters established by conventional originalist analysis) and their
broad, overriding libertarian aspirations (in that in selecting
from among various interpretive possibilities disclosed through
originalist analysis the judiciary remains true to the aspirations
of the framers when it engages in a liberty-maximizing
analysis).
Nevertheless, there are numerous problems with such an
analytical framework. For the most part, I will leave my articu-
lation of and response to those criticisms to another article, but
I will deal at this juncture with one that is central to the thesis
of this article. It has been argued that "liberty," like "equal-
ity," is a word that is so indeterminate that it is meaningless as
an independent guide in judicial decisionmaking.3 9 While I
acknowledge this is an insight with some force, I reject the
notion that it renders my analysis meaningless. To begin with,
emphasizing liberty channels arguments into a particular, and I
believe salutary, form. Furthermore, not every argument can
be cast in an equally effective or persuasive liberty-maximizing
form. A particularly adept lawyer might be capable of con-
structing liberty-based arguments in many surprising contexts,
but the capacity of even the best lawyer to do so in a persuasive
manner in every case is doubtful. Second, in the context of the
first amendment, we have other constraints provided by the
history and the language of the amendment itself. In that light,
we are able to focus on more specific notions of religious lib-
erty, rather than upon "liberty" in a general sense. In the fol-
lowing sections of this article, I argue that such a liberty-
maximizing analysis is challenging, yet viable.
38. As noted previously, Madison proposed that religious liberty be
protected unless: (1) the equal liberty of another would be limited by such an
expansion of religious liberty, or (2) the interest of the state were manifestly
endangered. See supra note 21.
39. See supra note 35 for citations regarding the ambiguous nature of
the term "liberty."
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II. MAXIMIZING LIBERTY UNDER THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
This section of this article has two subsections. • Part A sets
forth the various views regarding the establishment clause of
the first amendment that are obtained through an originalist
analysis. Part B examines each of those views to ascertain
which one, or which combination, best maximizes liberty. In
Part B, I also discuss the basic elements or components of reli-
gious liberty.
A. The Establishment Clause.- The Originalist Perimeter
Elsewhere, I have analyzed the text, history and structure
of the religion clauses of the first amendment in an originalist
manner and argued that two views set the outside perimeter or
establish the end points of a continuum of views espoused by
the framers and ratifiers of the first amendment.40 In that
work, I concluded that Justice Story summarized one such view
in his Commentaries on the Constitution and Madison articulated
the other view.
I have summarized the Story view as follows: "(1) the peo-
ple (generally, if not universally) believed that, in adopting the
first amendment, Christianity could be encouraged by the state,
provided only that such encouragement was not incompatible
with rights of worship of non-Christians; and (2) any attempt
'to level all religions, and to make it a matter of state policy to
hold all in utter indifference' would have met with 'universal dis-
approbation.' "" I also added that "Story apparently believed
that the promotion of a generalized or nondenominational
Christianity, provided it did not coerce another in the exercise
of her religious rights or rights of conscience, would receive
major support from within the states and not from the national
government.' '42
At the other end of the continuum was Madison's view.
For Madison, the first amendment was intended to protect
equal rights of conscience.43 Nevertheless, while "no single
religion or group of religions should be aided or established to
the exclusion of less orthodox religions,"44 Madison seemed to
support nonpreferential aid to or accommodation of religion,
so long as such accommodation did not deny another the equal
right of conscience and so long as it did not constitute adoption
40. See R. SMITH, supra note 5, at 37-120.
41. Id. at 108.
42. Id. at 108-09.
43. Id. at 45-62, 81-111.
44. Id. at 56.
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by the government of a given mode or form of worship.45 For
Madison, the liberty interest, or the right of conscience,46 was
preeminent in the framing of the religion clauses, and the gov-
ernment could not inhibit the exercise of one's right of con-
science unless "the preservation of equal liberty [be infringed],
and the existence of the State be manifestly endangered." ' 47
The perimeters, therefore, extend from the Story view,
which would permit the State to recognize nondenominational
Christianity so long as it did so in a tolerant manner, to the
Madisonian view, which would permit the State to accommo-
date or facilitate the free exercise of conscience, only if it did so
without infringing on another's equal liberty or placing its
imprimatur on a particular form or mode of worship.
Since writing Public Prayer and the Constitution, in which I dis-
cussed the history of the adoption and ratification of the reli-
gion clauses in detail, it has occurred to me that Madison's view
regarding nonpreferential aid can be broken down into three
subcategories: (1) the government may accommodate or facili-
tate religion, so long as it does so in a nonpreferential manner
(i.e., so long as it refrains from preferring one religion over
another); (2) the government may accommodate or facilitate
the exercise of conscience (as opposed to the more restrictive
term "religion"), so long as it does not prefer one form of con-
science over another; and (3) the government may accommo-
date or facilitate religion when to fail to do so would constitute
preferring nonreligion or irreligion over religion or conscience
(i.e., nonpreference between religion and nonreligion).
Madison himself seems to have vacillated over the course of his
lifetime as to which of these nonpreferentialist views he
espoused. With the rise in public favor of the Story view dur-
ing the early nineteenth century, which permitted the govern-
45. Id. at 66, 89-95.
46. Madison's provision regarding religions liberty, which he submitted
to the First Congress with his draft of a Bill of Rights, provided that:
The Civil Rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious
belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor
shall thefull and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, nor on any
pretext infringed. No state shall violate the equal rights of
conscience.
I ANNALS OF CONG. 451 (J. Gales ed. 1789), cited in R. SMITH, supra note 5, at
75. Madison no doubt emphasized the broader term "conscience" rather
than "religion" or "religious exercise" for fear that restricting such protec-
tion to "religion" might limit such liberty due to constrained interpretations
as to what is or is not religion or religious exercise for first amendment
purposes.
47. See R. SMITH, supra note 5, at 39.
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ment to accommodate nondenominational Christianity,
Madison seemed to react by gravitating from the nonprefer-
ence as to religion view to either the nonpreference as to mat-
ters of conscience or nonpreference between religion and
nonreligion views.48 It is clear that the latter view, that of non-
preference between religion and nonreligion, comes closest to
being a strict separationist position, but even it falls short of
calling for a nonreligious or irreligious public sector.
B. Maximizing Liberty: An Analysis of Possible Views
In this section, I examine each of the major views regard-
ing the religion clauses: strict separation, nonpreference
between religion and nonreligion, nonpreference as to matters
of conscience, nonpreference among religions, the Story view,
and the view that government may promote a particular reli-
gion. While I have argued elsewhere that neither strict separa-
tion nor the governmental promotion of a specific religion are
consistent with the intent of the framers and ratifiers, I will nev-
ertheless include them in my analysis for the purpose of deter-
mining whether or not they are better suited to promote
religious liberty (the aspiration of the framers and ratifiers)
than the other views. Before examining the various viewpoints,
however, I will set forth the nature of the liberty interests typi-
cally involved in delineating or defining religious liberty.
1. The Liberty Interests
There are four general liberty interests or areas of doctrine
that relate to the issue of religious liberty. They include the
right of religious speech or expression, the right of religious
association, the right to exercise one's religion freely, and the
right to be free from governmental establishment of religion.
Though each of these doctrinal areas have distinct conceptual
bases, it is clear that they often interrelate and may even some-
times conflict. A brief examination of each doctrinal area will
serve to highlight conceptual differences, as well as drawing
attention to some of the interrelationships.
48. Early in life, at the time he penned the Memorial and Remonstrance,
Madison seemed to opt for the view -permitting nonpreferential aid of
religion. See R. SMITH, supra note 5, at 51-59. By 1820, however, when he
penned his Detached Memoranda, Madison seems to have vacillated by coming
to espouse a view very close to the nonpreference between religion and
nonreligion view. Id. at 100-03.
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a. Religious Speech or Expression
The right of religious speech or expression has been rec-
ognized in various cases. There are those who have argued
that an aggressive use of the doctrine of free expression,
including religious expression, would go a long way toward
relaxing the evident tension between the free exercise and
establishment rights.4 9 Essentially, the right of religious
speech or expression protects religious liberty, by restraining
the government when it acts to limit or infringe religious
speech and expression.
Dean Choper, however, recently used the Yoder case as an
illustration of his point that the protection of religion or reli-
gious liberty from government regulation and intrusion is not
coextensive with the protection of religious speech and expres-
sion.'° Professor Stone agrees that the Court "extends ...
greater protection to religious choice than to expressive
choice. ' 51
While it is evident that, as a doctrinal matter, religious lib-
erty consists of more than protection of religious speech and
expression, it is also arguable that not all religious speech or
expression should receive the same degree of solicitude or pro-
tection afforded other forms of speech and expression. There
are times when the establishment clause liberty interest would
limit solicitude for religious speech or expression, in ways that
other nonreligious forms of expression need not be limited.
On occasion, governmental protection of religious expression
could be construed as giving a particular religion protection
not afforded other religions or as placing the imprimatur of the
state on that form of religious speech. For example, while a
court might recognize a limited public forum in the public ele-
mentary or secondary school context, it is certainly conceivable
that the court would not permit similar access for religious
speech or expression where recognizing that such speech or
expression would give impressionable students the sense that
government supported that religious speech. Similarly, where
permitting such religious expression gave rise to an environ-
ment of coercion in which student religious speakers used the
public forum as a means of coercing their fellow, nonbelieving
49. Marshall, Solving the Free Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as Expression,
67 MINN. L. REV. 545 (1983).
50. Choper, The Free Exercise Clause: A Structural Overview and An
Appraisal of Recent Developments, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 943, 944-50 (1986).
51. Stone, Constitutionally Compelled Exemptions and the Free Exercise Clause,
27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 985, 993-96 (1986).
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students, recognizing such expressions might not maximize
liberty.
Thus, while the protection of religious speech or expres-
sion is an element of religious liberty, it is both over- and
under-inclusive as a doctrinal matter. In other words, there are
additional elements to religious liberty that would cause reli-
gious expression to be more expansive than nonreligious
expression in some instances, and less expansive in other
instances, as a doctrinal matter. To delineate the nature of that
over- and under-inclusiveness, one must examine the other ele-
ments of religious liberty.
b. The Right of Religious Association
The first amendment recognizes a general right of assem-
bly and an implied right of association." That associational
right has particular force in the area of religion. Professor
Gedicks has recently made a strong case for recognizing a
vibrant right of religious association.53 In that article, Gedicks
argues that religious liberty often finds its fruition in the forma-
tion of an independent, autonomous group or community, a
group or community that should be protected from undue gov-
ernmental regulation. He argues that "when religious group
membership is genuinely voluntary, the need for government
intervention to protect individual autonomy upon an individ-
ual's rejection or expulsion from membership is substantially
52. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging . . . the right of the
people peaceably to assemble ..."U.S. CONST. amend. I. Of course, the
language of the first amendment expressly provides for a right of assembly, as
opposed to a right of association, but the right of assembly together with the
other express rights included in the first amendment imply a right of
association for the purpose of exercising those other specific rights. In his
opinion for the Court in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, at
623, Justice Brennan acknowledged the existence of an independent
associational right, when he noted:
There can be no clearer example of an intrusion into the internal
structure or affairs of an association than the regulation that forces
the groups to accept members it does not desire. Freedom of
association therefore plainly presupposes a freedom not to
associate.
However, Justice Brennan added that, like other first amendment rights, the
right to associate for expressive purposes is not "absolute." Id. As such,
"[i]nfringements in [the right to associate] may be justified by regulations
adopted to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of
ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of
associational freedoms." Id.
53. Gedicks, Towards a Constitutional jurisprudence of Religious Group Rights,
1989 Wis. L. REV. 99.
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diminished. Individual autonomy is adequately protected by
religious pluralism."15 4 In a different context, Professor Wat-
son recently argued that the emphasis of the western legal tra-
dition on individual liberty can have a deleterious effect on the
formation of a meaningful sense of community on the part of
individuals who do not share in that tradition.55 Care must be
taken, in such a context, to assure that the private, community-
forming aspect of the religious right of association is not wholly
overridden by the emphasis in our western legal tradition on
individual rights and interests.
The right of religious association seems to protect the lib-
erty of individuals to maximize their religious identity and lib-
erty by affiliating with groups of common believers. While such
an emphasis on or need for a sense of community occurs in
other contexts, it seems clear that the communal, associational
aspect of religious groups is particularly powerful and deserv-
ing of protection in the interest of maximizing religious liberty.
It is precisely this associational interest that seemed to be
determinative with regard to the Court's recent decision in
Amos,56 in which the Court upheld the right of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints to place religious qualifica-
tions or limitations on their employees.
As is the case with regard to the free speech and expres-
sion interest, however, the right of religious association is not
and should not be without limit. Given the proliferation of the
public sector and the growth of the regulatory state, conflicts
between religious associations and the government have been
and no doubt will continue to be exacerbated. This exacerba-
tion, in turn, has contributed to the need to delineate more
clearly between the proper role and sphere of influence of both
the religious community as it comes into contact with or seeks
to influence the public sector and the government as it directly
or indirectly regulates the religious community. The need for
noncoercion, both on the part of the government and on the
part of the religious community as they interact, and the need
for equality of treatment among religious and, perhaps, non-
religious groups or communities is heightened in the contem-
porary context.
54. Id. at 153.
55. Watson, The Justice of the U.S. Constitution, 1 INTER. J. MORAL &
SOCIAL STUDIES 21 (1986).
56. The Church ofJesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S.
327 (1987).
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c. The Right of Free Exercise
In addition to the right of association and the right of free
speech or expression, the first amendment expressly provides
for a right of free exercise. The right to exercise one's religion
free from governmental infringement is perhaps the most criti-
cal element of religious liberty. Most commonly, when the
Court recognizes the right of free exercise, it does so by
exempting a religious individual or group from a governmental
regulation. Such a regulation may be expressly or directly
addressed to religious exercise. In that case, the governmental
intrusion or infringement is subjected to very strict scrutiny.57
In other instances, the infringement is indirect or incidental,58
and it is in these cases that the most significant problems arise
in deciding free exercise .cases and fashioning legal doctrine.
This is not surprising, because exempting a person on reli-
gious grounds from the coverage of a law or regulation of gen-
eral scope not directed expressly, by its terms, to a religious
exercise creates a tension or preference that seemingly goes to
the heart of religious liberty. Judge Arlin Adams recently rec-
ognized this tension when he noted that "[i]f the government
(through the courts or otherwise) grants an exemption to a
believer under the free exercise clause, while requiring all
others to obey the law, the government effectively prefers the
religion of that individual over the religion of those individuals
who adhere to other religious beliefs . - 9 Relatedly, Profes-
sor Stone has argued that there are two difficulties that arise
when, under the free exercise clause or some other provision, a
constitutionally compelled exemption is recognized: (1) it
"may create preferences that directly undermine the very con-
stitutional guarantees that [such exemptions are] designed to
protect,"6 and (2) it "may necessitate inquiries (into matters
such as sincerity) that may themselves undermine the very con-
stitutional guarantees that the exemptions are designed to
protect. '
6 1
Thus, with the free exercise clause, as with the rights of
expression and association, we are faced with a dilemma, per-
haps even a catch-22. On the one hand, recognizing the right
57. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1250-53 (2d ed.
1988).
58. Id. at 1254-55, 1262-75.
59. Adams & Gordon, The Doctrine of Accommodation in the Jurisprudence of
the Religion Clauses, 37 DE PAUL L. REV. 317, 328 (1988).
60. Stone, supra note 51, at 987.
61. Id. at 988.
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of free exercise requires that individuals be exempted from
general legislation when that legislation infringes on their right
of free exercise. On the other hand, however, when govern-
ment acts to.exempt an individual from a law of general appli-
cation it seemingly prefers that religion. This preference may
generate an establishment clause issue.
d. The Right to Be Free From Governmental Establishment of
Religion
The right to be free from laws or regulations "respecting
an establishment of religion '"62 is expressly included in the first
amendment as well. Given the potential excesses, upon appli-
cation, of each of the other rights, as related to religious lib-
erty, it is not surprising that the framers saw fit to include a
right to be free from governmental establishment of religion.
Allowed to proceed without limit, the rights of free exercise,
association and expression, as applied, would themselves
undermine the very religious liberty they were designed to fur-
ther. The establishment clause was intended, therefore, to per-
form a liberty-maximizing function, by limiting the excesses of
each of the other first amendment doctrines applicable in the
religious liberty context. Potentially, it also helps secure liberty
by limiting the power of the state to coerce or influence reli-
gious choices, to otherwise show preference for one religion
over another, or to place its imprimatur on a particular religion
or group of religions. The need for a clause to perform such a
function is all the more acute in contemporary America, which
is characterized by a pervasive regulatory structure unimagined
by the framers.
However, the challenges are even subtler than those just
enumerated. The establishment clause must do more than
check the excesses of the other elements of religious liberty. It
must also deal with the problem of governmental coercion and
largesse. During the framing era, the major concerns of the
framers and ratifiers focused on their fear that government
might intrude unduly into matters of religious expression,
association and exercise by preferring one religion or group of
religions over others. They were also concerned that the new
government might use its purse in a way that unduly influenced
religious choice. Today, however, with the growth of govern-
mental power and regulation, and the pervasiveness of various
governmental programs and institutions-perhaps most nota-
bly the taxing, spending and commerce powers-government
62. U.S.*CONST. amend. I.
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has a capacity to influence religious choice in a manner incon-
ceivable to the framers. In this context, the establishment
clause must function not merely to limit government excesses
by assuring that the judiciary does not carve out exemptions or
doctrinal preferences that hinder religion; it must also be used
to create doctrines that enhance religious liberty, both of indi-
viduals and' churches, in an era of burgeoning government.
The government, particularly through the legislative and exec-
utive branches, has the power to accommodate or facilitate reli-
gious exercise by creating legislative and administrative
exemptions of varying breadth. It also has the power to use its
largesse to accommodate religious exercise, through tax and
budgetary benefits, although in this area it confronts strong,
institutional disincentives. Each such exemption or allocation
has the effect of creating budgetary and related costs and ineffi-
ciencies for the government. This is particularly true when a
minority religion is the potential beneficiary, because in addi-
tion to the inefficient and sometimes costly nature of creating
and maintaining religious budgetary or related exemptions,
such minorities have little political clout. Thus, over the course
of our history, the Court, which has assumed the primary role
in formulating constitutional doctrine, either by default or
otherwise, must formulate an establishment clause doctrine
that maximizes liberty and minimizes the costs attendant with
the vindication of that liberty.6"
Accordingly, in our examination of each proffered doctri-
nal framework in the establishment clause area, we must be
attentive to the need to address the excesses of each of the
other elements of religious liberty (expression, association and
exercise) and their potential for limiting the very liberty they
are intended to effectuate. As trying and unsettling as this task
may be, it is compounded by the fact that the doctrine must be
fine-tuned in an environment dominated by an ever-increasing
regulatory state, a state inclined to take all that comes in its way
into its vortex. It is precisely this problem that I believe Dallin
Oaks was referring to when he argued that, as the regulatory
state has grown, it has been forced to accommodate religious
exercise, but paradoxically; with each new accommodation, it
63. In United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938), the Court recognized that the judiciary - an independent and
nonelected branch of government - has a peculiar role in protecting the
constitutional rights of minorities that might be restricted from giving redress
from the majoritarian, democratic political processes. The framers certainly
recognized this principle as well. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST, Nos. 78 and 80,
supra note 4, at 469-70, 478.
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has widened its regulatory vortex and limited free exercise. 6' A
viable and vibrant establishment clause must address this
threat to religious liberty as well. In doing so, it must be sensi-
tive to the role of the judiciary and the legislative and executive
branches 65 of government, and it must be sensitive to transac-
tion costs, as it allocates burdens among individuals and the
state in formulating its doctrine.
2. A Liberty-Maximizing Analysis of Various Establishment
Clause Doctrines
With the foregoing, formidable challenges to any viable
and vibrant establishment clause doctrine in mind, I will
examine each of the theoretical bases for establishment clause
doctrine. I will begin from one end of the continuum and work
my way to the other end. To this end, I will examine each of
the following views: the view that government may promote a
national religion' the Story view that government may promote
or accommodate nondenominational Christianity (or Judeo-
Christian religion); the nonpreferentialist view that govern-
ment may accommodate or facilitate religious exercise in a
nonpreferential manner; and the strict separationist view that
government must maintain a nonreligious public sector. Con-
cluding as I do that the general nonpreferentialist view has the
greatest potential for maximizing religious liberty, I then turn
to an examination of each of the three nonpreferentialist views,
to ascertain which one of them has the greatest likelihood of
minimizing the problems attendant with nonpreferentialist the-
ory and of maximizing liberty in the process.
a. Promoting a National Religion
From a liberty-maximizing standpoint, the view that gov-
ernment may selectively promote religion has little to com-
mend it. It is outside the perimeters set by the intent of the
64. Oaks, Separation, Accommodation and the Future of Church and State, 35
DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (1985).
65. It should never be forgotten that there are costs that attend
pursuing litigation. Such costs must be taken into account when the Court is
allocating burdens of proof and establishing doctrinal standards in the first
amendment area. If the Court places heavy burdens or creates unclear
doctrine, it may well inhibit the religious rights of individuals, because such
individuals may find themselves unable to initiate and maintain a suit against
the government to vindicate their rights. In addition to economic costs, such
unclear or ill-defined doctrinal matters may also give courts discretion to
limit the rights of disfavored, minority religions. See L. TRIBE, supra note 57,
at 1244-46.
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framers and ratifiers precisely because they believed that the
religion clauses were necessary to avoid the infringement on
liberty caused by such a state of affairs. The Anglican Church
had been the established Church in Britain, at the time of the
Revolution, and had, in the eyes of the framers, been an instru-
ment of oppression by virtue of that status. English history was
filled with violence and intolerance as the result of such an
establishment and its impact on those who refused to accept
the doctrine or faith of the established church.
However, despite this history and the clear sense that a
specific religious establishment, by its very nature, demeans the
liberty of those who do not accept it, there are some possible
liberty-enhancing arguments favoring such a view. If such a
religion were to hold as a major article of its faith the belief that
all should be free to choose in religious matters and that the
government should do nothing to inhibit that choice, such an
establishment might not intrude unduly on religious liberty (at
least in theory). If such a religion were established, it might
have little tendency to infringe on religious liberty, and by its
very doctrine might encourage the government in its effort to
afford a breadth of religious liberty and toleration to its citi-
zenry. However, conceived as such, the established religion
would have little reason for being established or preferred by
the government, and its contribution to religious liberty would
be merely derivative. It would be derivative in the sense that
government would be encouraged to promote religious liberty,
precisely because it had as its established religion a liberty-
minded church.
If the benefit of such an established religion is purely
derivative, however, it would have little to commend it, other
than the fortuity of the doctrine of the established church, and
it would be the doctrine that ensured liberty not the fact that
the church was established. A proponent of such an establish-
ment might respond, however, that a liberty-minded estab-
lished church would promote liberty by its force of presence
and by its contribution to order. In that sense, the existence of
such an established church would facilitate the state in its
efforts to ensure religious liberty, by contributing to the doctri-
nal basis for such liberty and by eliminating the rush of reli-
gious sects to gain political power and promote their religion
by obtaining the imprimatur of the state.
Even cast in its most appealing form, however, such an
establishment has within it the very seeds of its demise as a lib-
erty-maximizing device. On the one hand, it is hard to imagine
that even such a liberty-minded church would not use the
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power and prestige of the state, at least subtly, to encourage
the citizenry to accept its theology or modes of worship, as well
as its doctrine regarding religious liberty. As such, the very
appeal of its doctrine regarding religious liberty, coupled with
its establishment, might have the tendency subtly to incline the
populous to accept the rest of its theology. Its appeal in terms
of order is also questionable. Having created the precedent of
an establishment, and coupling that precedent with a doctrine
of religious liberty that would permit other churches free reign,
it is quite conceivable that the liberty-minded church would
one day be displaced by a church more bent on overtly using
the government to promote its doctrine. Given these objec-
tions, it would seem that the framers were right: an established
churchhas little to commend it in terms of its capacity to maxi-
mize liberty.
b. The Story View
Professor Esbeck, without directly referring to the Story
view, has summarized it effectively in his definition of "restora-
tionists": "[R]estorationists have no intention of engaging in
religious persecution in the sense of coercion of conscience.
They recognize that conversion to Christianity, if it is to be sin-
cere, must be wholly voluntary. Accordingly, the state [may]
prefer the Christian faith, which they believe would subtly
encourage conversion, while refraining from acts of intolerance
toward dissenters."66 The Story view-that the government
may promote nondenominational Christianity in a tolerant
manner-like the view that the government may prefer a spe-
cific religion, has little to commend it as a liberty-maximizing
theory. Its strengths lie in other areas.
Like the view that government may establish a specific reli-
gion, the Story view seemingly would promote order, by limit-
ing controversy among Christian groups, which is common in
our society, and by promoting "tolerance" toward other
groups. With such order and tolerance, so the argument goes,
liberty would be promoted, because the principal reasons for
religious strife, particularly among major religions, would be
removed. The appeal of such a position, like the appeal of
Oscar Wilde's suggestion that the best way to cope with temp-
tation is to give in to it, is facetious at best and pernicious at
worst.
6 7
66. Esbeck, Five Views of Church-State Relations in Contemporary American
Thought, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 371, 401.
67. 0. WILDE, THE PICTURE OF DORIAN GRAY (1974).
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Tolerance is hardly liberty. Indeed, tolerance by its very
nature is a notion that recognizes insiders and outsiders, win-
ners and losers. Those who tolerate are insiders, winners if
you will. Those who are tolerated are outsiders, the losers.
The message to outsiders is none too veiled: their views are
paternalistically tolerated by those in power, much as a parent
accepts momentary indiscretions on the part of their children
as a cost of growing up.
Moreover, the concept of "nondenominational Christian-
ity" is hardly productive of the order it promises. Groups that
call themselves "Christian" often disagree as to what consti-
tutes true "Christianity." There is some similarity of doctrine
and belief among Christian denominations, but disagreement
runs deep. There is disagreement even as to what scriptures
are acceptable as a source of theological doctrine.6" And the
interpretation of those scriptural sources, even when these are
agreed upon, invites disagreement. Furthermore, if one dis-
counts such differences, by creating a nondenominational least
common denominator, religion is stripped of much of its vital-
ity. Thus, under the Story view, the government is left, at best,
to promote a trivialized religion, a religion of the least common
denominator-a religion that no group really accepts, and
whose only redeeming virtues are that it allows the government
to keep the people at peace and keep religious groups away
from the public trough. Thus defined, the Story view has every
appearance of being a device to trivialize religion, and may well
permit the government to legitimize its unwillingness to recog-
nize religious expression, association and exercise when these
interests come in conflict with governmental ends. Religion is
trivialized as a doctrinal matter under such a view, and religious
exercise, expression and association are liable to be minimized
by a sort of "I gave at the office" rationale, in which govern-
ment, having recognized, albeit in a trivial way, the minimalist
trappings of Christianity, need not concern itself with other-
68. For example, in discussing Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (1963), I have previously noted that
The school districts [in Schernpp] had encouraged Bible reading and
recitation, but difficulties arose over what version of the Bible
should be used. Catholics prefer the Douay version, Jews reject the
New Testament, and even Protestants split as to which of many
translations of the Bible is preferable. Given these differences,
which are themselves often rooted in doctrine, the Bible reading
involved in Schempp raised problems of a theological nature. The
Bible is not easily susceptible to nondenominational use in a
Christian or Judeo-Christian sense.
R. SMITH, supra note 5, at 183.
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wise accommodating specific religions or individual religious
exercise.
c. The Nonpreferential View
By its terms, the nonpreferential view-the view that gov-
ernment may accommodate religious exercise or matters of
conscience, so long as it does so in a nonpreferential manner-
is less prone to the creation of outsiders than are the Story and
established national religion views previously analyzed. Non-
preferentialists would permit all to share equally in govern-
ment accommodations or facilitations of religion and religious
exercise. They would also seemingly eschew any efforts by
government to adopt a given mode, form or article of worship
as the government's own, or to coerce individuals or groups in
their religious beliefs.
Furthermore, on the surface, the nonpreferential theory
resolves the excesses of the expression, association and exer-
cise elements of religious liberty, because it would limit their
application by requiring that all be treated equally or non-
preferentially. Exemptions from governmental regulations,
sharing of governmental largesse, religious expression and
association would all be subject to the restriction that govern-
ment could not act in a preferential manner.
At least in theory, the nonpreferentialists also would be
able to deal with the issue of growth in government and its
capacity and perhaps even propensity to regulate religion into
oblivion or obsequiousness. Nonpreferentialism would permit
and perhaps even mandate accommodation, as a means of deal-
ing with government coercion. Professor Tushnet has referred
to institutional coercion as a form of coercion that must be
dealt with under a religion clause analysis. For Professor
Tushnet, institutional coercion-the kind of coercion most
common in our regulatory state-occurs when "the govern-
ment creates a set of institutions, none of which individually
have a religious purpose but all of which together create incen-
tives that influence or, more strongly, coerce choice in religious
matters."' 69 The nonpreferentialist would argue that her equal-
ity principle, the principle of governmental nonpreference in
69. Tushnet, Reflections on the Role of Purpose in the Jurisprudence of the
Religion Clauses, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 997, 999 (1986). Recognizing such
institutional coercion and its impact on religious exercise, Professor Tushnet
goes on to note that, "[u]nfortunately, an analysis of institutional coercion
shows how difficult it is to link the coercion of tax payments to restrictions on
religious liberty." Id.
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matters of religion, would limit institutional coercion by requir-
ing the government to treat all religions alike and to coerce
none in the process. Relatedly, since all religious sects would
understand that they were to be treated equally, religious strife
would lessen-what one received, all would be eligible to
receive.
While there is appeal in each of these arguments,
problems do arise. As one reflects on the equality aspect of the
nonpreference principle that would imbue establishment clause
doctrine with its meaning under the nonpreferentialist view, it
becomes evident that Professor Westen's insight that the equal-
ity principle standing alone is empty or devoid of doctrinal
meaning has some force in this area.70 For example, rather
than leading to more accommodation, particularly in the free
exercise area, an unfettered nonpreferentialist doctrine could
be interpreted in such a manner that its use might lead to less
liberty, as applied. Under such an interpretation, an individual
seeking to be freed from the strictures of a regulation that
offended her religion would be precluded from obtaining such
freedom, because to permit that individual to be exempt from
such a law, unless the law was directed specifically at her reli-
gion, would be to prefer that individual's religion over
another's or over nonreligion generally. Since the nonprefer-
ence doctrine prohibits governmental preference in matters of
religion, no such exemption could be recognized. Similarly, a
church seeking to protect its associational rights, as did the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints in the Amos case
(under which it sought exemption from personnel regulations
of the Civil Rights Act), would be precluded from doing so,
because not all religions would need such an exemption. Fur-
thermore, even as to sharing in the governmental largesse,
problems would arise. For example, if legislation were devised
whereby religious institutions were permitted to obtain govern-
mental support for their sectarian schools, two difficulties
would have to be faced. First, religions that do not have
schools or lack the resources to develop them would be able to
argue, with some force, that they were being discriminated
against-that the legislation was designed to prefer those reli-
gious groups that have or can afford to maintain such schools.
Second, since public money could not be used to further one
religion's mission over another's, the government would need
70. Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982); but
see, Chemerinsky, In Defense of Equality: A Reply to Professor l1esten, 81 MIcH. L.
REV. 573 (1983).
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either to ensure that the funds were being spent for secular
purposes or would need to give similar amounts to all religious
groups for the furtherance of aspects of their religion. On the
other hand, however, in an effort to maximize religious liberty,
the nonpreference or equality principle might be interpreted,
as it most often is, " to permit religions to have nonpreferen-
tial access to governmental accommodations or benefits, even
though not every religion is equally situated to share in those
benefits. On the whole, it would seem that such a view would
do more to promote religious liberty, but its excesses, in terms
of preference for more politically astute and powerful religions,
remain troublesome and would necessitate some limiting doc-
trines. At any rate, it is clear from the preceding definitional
analysis, that nonpreferentialism is not self-effectuating.
Rather it derives meaning as it is interpreted. Nevertheless, I
remain convinced that nonpreferentialism is not meaningless,
particularly when the interpreter focuses on the liberty-maxi-
mizing purpose of the theory.
In addition to the argument that the broad concept of non-
preference is without substantive meaning, it should also be
noted that the use of the notion of "religion" in nonpreferen-
tialism is potentially exclusionary in two senses. It excludes the
nonbeliever, and it has the potential of excluding religions that
are less conventional. Less conventional and certainly many
nonwestern religions do not share the common indicia of most
mainline or mainstream western religions, and the judge or
decisionmaker given the responsibility of insuring against non-
preference might be inclined by her own religious bias or by
acceptance of a western definitional framework to limit the
ambit of such a nonpreferential treatment to conventional reli-
gions which share common and familiar indicia of what it
means to be a "religion." The decisionmaker also might get
involved in determinations of sincerity and might be inclined to
find participation in less conventional religions to be less sin-
cere and therefore less deserving of protection. In summary,
the term "nonpreference" is so broad that it lacks self-effectu-
ating meaning, without more qualification, and use of the term
"religion" to limit such a broad reading may incline toward
exclusion. The theoretical trick thus seems to be to find a form
71. See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1981), in which the Court
held that a facially neutral tax deduction was not unconstitutional on
establishment clause grounds merely because its financial benefits flowed
principally to families of parochial school children.
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of nonpreference that is neither so broad as to be devoid of
meaning nor so narrow as to be exclusionary.
Finally, if nonpreferential doctrine is used as a means of
expanding government accommodation of religion, in terms of
the sharing of the government's largesse, it might open new
areas of regulation of religion, thereby restricting rather than
enhancing religious liberty. Governmental sharing of its lar-
gesse is often conditional, and such conditions may well coerce
religions and religious exercise.
Thus, while of all the doctrines discussed so far the non-
preferentialist doctrine has the most appeal as a liberty-maxi-
mizing doctrine, it needs to be clarified in a definitional sense.
It also must be designed to deal with the problem of providing
exemptions under free exercise and associational principles to
some but not all religions, because not all religions and individ-
ual religionists are similarly affected by various governmental
regulations.
The definitional problem may be solved by getting clearer
about what is meant by "nonpreference"-nonpreference
among religions, nonpreference as to matters of conscience, or
nonpreference between religion and nonreligion. The prob-
lem regarding exemptions might be resolved, in part, by recog-
nizing that while all religions do not qualify for or stand in
need of the same exemptions, they all are better off, in terms of
a liberty-maximizing analysis, by the recognition of specific
exemptions, whether or not they qualify for each such exemp-
tion, at least to the extent that the government is not involved
in creating such exemptions for improper, preferential reasons.
Under such reasoning, specific exemptions would be accepta-
ble unless it could be established that the creation of the
exemption by the government was tainted by improper motives
(much like the discriminatory purpose analysis extant in dispa-
rate impact cases in equal protection analysis in the racial
context7 2)
While it is clear that nonpreferential theory has appeal as a
libertarian theoretical basis for establishment clause doctrine, it
needs embellishment or development as a theory. However,
before endeavoring to salvage nonpreferential theory, by
embellishing on its theoretical underpinnings, I will examine
the strict separationist theory to ascertain whether it has lib-
72. For example, in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976), the
Court asserted that, "the basic equal protection principles that the invidious
quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminating must ultimately be traced
to a racially discriminatory purpose."
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erty-maximizing virtues that render rehabilitation or clarifica-
tion of nonpreferentialist theory unnecessary.
d. The Strict Separation View
Strict separationists have long argued that their view -
that government and religion should be entirely separate-
enhances individual freedom.73 In essence, they argue that vol-
untarism and separatism imbue their strict separationist view
with a liberty-maximizing effect or meaning. Professor Kurland
has argued that his version of strict separation, which he labels
"neutrality," 74 insures that each individual may make religious
and nonreligious choices without interference from govern-
ment. 75 As Professor Van Alstyne notes in a similar regard,
"Voluntarism [is] the principle of personal choice."' 76 Both
Professors Kurland and Van Alystyne add that the establish-
ment clause includes a notion of separatism, as well. Professor
Van Alstyne refers to such separatism as "the principle of non-
entanglement [between government and religion]," 77 and Pro-
fessor Kurland refers to it as the avoidance of the "havoc that
religious conflicts ha[ve] imposed on mankind throughout his-
tory. ' ' 78 Thus, voluntarism (the right to choose free from gov-
ernment coercion or influence) and separatism (the right to be
free from government entanglement) are related principles
adhered to by most strict separationists. As such, it is argued
that a strict separation of church and state facilitates liberty by
73. See, e.g., Dorsen, The Religion Clauses and Nonbelievers, 27 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 865 (1986), and the discussion of strict separationist theory in
Esbeck, supra note 66, at 379-85.
74. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV.
1 (1961). In this seminal article, Professor Kurland sets forth his theory of
governmental "neutrality" as to matters of religion.
75. Id. See also, Kurland, The Origins of the Religion Clauses of the
Constitution, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 839 (1986) [hereinafter Origins].
76. Van Alstyne, Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling Wall
- A Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DUKE L.J. 770, 779.
77. Id.
78. Kurland, Origins, supra note 76, at 860. In this regard, Professor
Kurland stated:
I think I can confidently say that the intended direction of the First
Amendment was the enhancement of individual freedom. I am also
confident that the objectives were to establish an equality among
persons, so that each individual could choose without interference
how to commune with God, and to avoid the havoc that religious
conflicts had imposed on mankind throughout history.
Id. While I generally agree with each of these preliminary points raised by
Professor Kurland, I do not share his historical and theoretical conclusion
that strict neutrality or separation was intended by the framers.
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insuring that choices in the religious context are both voluntary
and privatized. Strict separationists argue that such voluntary,
privatized choice protects believer and non-believer alike, and
maximizes the liberty of all in the process. They add that the
merger of religion with the state trivializes or "profanes"
religion.
Such a theory, however, does not survive scrutiny on either
voluntarism or separatism grounds. Strict separation does not
facilitate voluntarism in a libertarian sense. Given the massive
growth of the public sector, to limit free exercise or the exer-
cise of one's voluntary right of conscience to the private sector
is to constrain the right and liberty itself. Under conventional
free exercise analysis, an analysis many strict separationists
purport to be in agreement with, an individual may argue that
her free exercise right has been violated by a government regu-
lation. The regulation may be direct, in that by its express
terms it regulates specific religious activity, or indirect, in that
its terms are general in application but have the effect of
infringing on or limiting one's free exercise right. Strict
separationists, like nonpreferentialists, have no problem with
regard to direct, express governmental limitations on free exer-
cise, because government has no business promulgating regu-
lations that directly infringe the right of free exercise.
However, with regard to regulations that are general in applica-
tion but have the incidental effect of infringing an individual's
free exercise, strict separationists have conceptual difficulties
with accommodating an individual's free exercise right. If a
strict separationist were to recognize such a voluntary right,
she would carve out an exemption, on religious grounds, to a
general regulation, and in the process would arguably result in
governmental favoritism toward religion. Such favoritism may
effectuate voluntarism, but it violates the principle of separa-
tism. Thus, separatism conflicts with voluntarism, unless vol-
untarism is read restrictively to include only express, specific
governmental denials of religious liberty. Such a limited volun-
tarism is hardly liberty-maximizing in our contemporary regu-
latory state. This limited voluntarism also would restrict
carving out exemptions in furtherance of the free expression
and associational rights or elements of religious liberty,
because to carve out such an exemption would cause govern-
ment to cease to remain strictly separated from religion.
Apart from the conflict between the voluntarism and sepa-
ratist principles that inheres in strict separationist theory, the
separatist ideal itself is impractical or unobtainable. Professor
Tushnet recognizes this when he points out that "institutional
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coercion" arises whenever "government creates a set of institu-
tions, none of which individually have a religious purpose but
all of which together create incentives that influence or, more
strongly, coerce choice in religious matters."' 79 Tushnet goes
on to note that. governmental subsidization of secular educa-
tion constitutes just such institutional coercion.80 Professor
Gelfand has made a somewhat similar point with regard to the
teaching of creation science or evolution in public schools. 8'
With the expansion of the public sector, to demand that the
public realm remain free from religious activity and from the
accommodation of religious exercise within the sector, is to dis-
parage or limit voluntary religious exercise on the ground that
it should be privatized. Again, while such separatism may be
supported by various values independent of individual liberty,
it is clear that separatism, particularly in late twentieth century
America, does not maximize religious liberty.
Indeed, the limited voluntarism required by the separatist
value espoused by strict separationists, together with the ten-
dency of separatism to limit the ambit of free exercise to a
shrinking private sector, indicate that the strict separation view
is less libertarian, in terms of maximizing religious liberty, than
the nonpreferentialist and possibly even the Story views. The
call for "irreligion in the public sector" is a call for minimizing
religious exercise, expression and association by privatizing it.
Neither the Story view nor the nonpreferentialist view limit
exercise, expression and association in this way; rather, both
seek to effectuate a less restrictive alternative, in terms of limit-
ing the liberty interests involved. They seek a balance in this
regard by regulating the excesses of public accommodation,
either by imposing a tolerance or an equality limitation on such
an accommodation principle.
It should be added that the strict separationist view, like
the nonpreferentialist view, has definitional problems with
regard to determining what is "religion" for strict separationist
purposes. If some exercise or act is religious, then it must be
purged from the public sector; but it is not clear, as has been
noted, whether "religion" should be read broadly or restric-
tively. Indeed, for her theory to remain viable at all today, I
would argue that the strict separationist must define "religion"
restrictively so as to accommodate and permit actions in the
79. Tushnet, supra note 69, at 999.
80. Id. at 999-1000.
81. Gelfand, Of Monkeys and Men: An Atheist's Heretical View of the
Constitutionality of Teaching the Disproof of a Religion in the Public Schools, 16 J.L. &
EDUC. 271 (1987).
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public realm that might otherwise be considered to be reli-
gious.82 Of course, if this were the case, that which is most
clearly religious and at the heart of religious exercise would be
restricted, while more trivial and less important religious acts
would be accommodated by reading "religion" restrictively. In
this way the strict separationist view may tend to trivialize
religion.
In summary, while each of the theories proffered as an
underpinning for establishment theory has problems in terms
of maximizing religious liberty, the nonpreferentialist theory
seems to be the most likely candidate for elaboration. In the
following section, I will analyze nonpreferentialist theory by
examining three derivations of such a theory-nonpreference
as to religion, nonpreference as to conscience, and nonprefer-
ence between religion and nonreligion-to determine which of
those derivations best maximizes liberty. In this regard, it is
interesting to note that the three theories of nonpreference
also fall on a continuum between the Story and the strict sepa-
rationist views: the nonpreference among religions view is
closest to the Story view, the nonpreference between religion
and nonreligion view is closest to the strict separationist posi-
tion, and the nonpreference as to matters of conscience view is
in the middle. In fact, in his taxonomy of strict separationist
views, Professor Esbeck has created a category, which he labels
"pluralistic separationism," which comes quite close to defin-
ing the view that government may not prefer religion over
nonreligion. 8
3
e. Rehabilitating the Nonpreferential View: Three Possibilities
As previously noted, nonpreferentialism, like equality, can
be fairly devoid of meaning without doctrinal or theoretical
limitation from some other source. Nevertheless, some limita-
tion occurs in the first amendment context, because the equal-
ity notion is limited by its reference to religion, conscience, or
82. Id. Professor Gelfand makes an interesting argument to the effect
that neither evolutionary theory nor creationist theory may be taught in the
public schools, because the teaching of either one prefers one religion over
another. As an atheist, Professor Gelfand asserts that his religion (or at least
the disproof of religion) is furthered when evolution is taught. While I have
argued that Professor Gelfand inappropriately arrogates scientific theory to
his religion, I would concede that his thesis is troublesome. Indeed, his
argument illustrates the need to define "religion" restrictively under strict
separationist theory to avoid purging the teaching or support of doctrines
like evolution from the public sector.
83. Esbeck, supra note 66, at 385-89.
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religion and nonreligion. However, as will be shown, the third
category, nonpreference between religion and nonreligion, is
the least susceptible to definitional limitation, because using
religion and nonreligion as one's frame of reference does little
to reduce the notion of equality from its generalized and fairly
meaningless status.
L. Nonpreference Among Religions
While "religion" itself is not susceptible of easy definition,
it arguably is a less expansive category then either "con-
science" or "religion and nonreligion." It therefore, may be
asserted that using nonpreference as to religion as one's cat-
gory helps to secure religious liberty by giving one a managea-
ble concept, one that lends more meaning to a largely empty
equality or nonpreference notion. Proponents of the non-
preference as to religion view argue as well that retaining a the-
istic meaning or basis for categorization is both in keeping with
the language of the first amendment and is more likely to cre-
ate an equilibrium between the free exercise and establishment
provisions of the first amendment and thereby maximize reli-
gious liberty. It may be argued, in this regard, that if one
broadens the accommodationist aspect of establishment clause
analysis to include conscience or religion and nonreligion, it is
more likely that with each expansion of liberty through accom-
modation under the establishment clause, there will be a con-
comitant reduction in free exercise. This reduction in free
exercise will presumably occur because the sphere of govern-
mental regulation of religion will expand with each new accom-
modation, and with each such expansion of the regulatory
domain the opportunity for government regulation of religion
increases. s4 It also may be argued that with an expansive defi-
nition of nonpreference legislators may be less willing to
accommodate such exercise, because they will have to include
less desirable groups in their beneficiary pool and because the
cost to government of the accommodation will rise with regard
to each new exemption granted.
84. See Oaks, supra note 64. Oaks asserts in this regard that:
The problem with a definition of religion that includes almost
everything is that the practical effect of inclusion comes to mean
almost nothing. Free exercise protections become diluted as their
scope becomes more diffuse. When religion has no more right to
free exercise than irreligion or any other secular philosophy, the
whole newly expanded category of "religion" is likely to diminish in
significance. This has already happened.
Id. at 8.
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I am inclined to believe that such a theory of equilibrium is
faulty, because it does not necessarily follow that a more expan-
sive definition of the category of recipient of accommodation,
whether in the legislative or judicial form, leads to a reduction
in free exercise. Nevertheless, some case law under the estab-
lishment clause seems to support the view that expansion
under an accommodationist establishment doctrine leads to
reduction in free exercise, expression and association rights.8 5
Whatever its virtues may be, there are serious problems
from a liberty-maximizing viewpoint with the nonpreference as
to religion view. The foremost problem centers on the fact that
the term "religion" has the potential of being under-inclusive
and discriminatory in its application. Judge Arlin Adams, who
has tried his judicial hand at defining "religion, ' '8 6 argues that
permitting the government broad power to accommodate reli-
gion, so long as such religious accommodation is applied in a
nonpreferential manner, "might increase the accommodation
of mainstream religions, but would compromise the rights of
minority religions and add dramatically to the government's
involvement in religious affairs." '87 Giving governmental offi-
cials the job of defining what is or is not a religion for accom-
modation or aid purposes is troublesome, precisely because
government officials tend to represent mainstream religious
views and might well be inclined to spurn minority religions.
The government officials may do so by simply deciding that the
doctrine is so unconventional that it cannot be termed "reli-
gious." The power to define, is, as such, the power to limit.
The threat to the liberty of believers and nonbelievers from a
restrictive definition is evident.
85. Two recent free exercise cases that come readily to mind in this
regard are United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982), in which the Court
rejected an Amish's claim that his free exercise right required that he be
exempted from social security taxes, and Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) in which the Court held that the free
exercise clause does not prohibit the federal government from permitting the
building of a road and commercial harvesting of timber on a portion of the
National Forest traditionally used for religious purposes by American
Indians.
In both of these cases, the Court evidenced a reluctance to recognize
significant free exercise claims, in part, I believe, because they felt that they
might open Pandora's Box, in the sense that every plausible religion (and
some not so plausible religions) might seek exemption from government
regulations or decisions on free exercise grounds.
86. Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 208-10 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J.,
concurring).
87. Adams and Gordon, supra note 59, at 320.
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Relatedly, the likelihood of coercion increases when gov-
ernment officials are given discretion in providing substance to
a legal definition of "religion." Consciously or subconsciously,
decisionmakers may bring their own subjective sense of what is
right into the definition-making enterprise. As such, the gov-
ernment may place its imprimatur on one religion and not
another, albeit in the guise of treating all "religions" equally.
The likelihood of such coercion is exacerbated in the legislative
and executive context, because elected officials will be inclined
to aid or accommodate majority religions, religions that consti-
tute a larger number of their constituents, rather than minority,
disfavored or unpopular religions. If the judiciary defers to
legislative and executive definitions of "religion," infringement
of minority religious exercise and association will increase.
Finally, taking funds from nonbelievers or nonreligionists,
in the form of tax dollars, to accommodate religions hardly
advances the liberty of those from whom such funds are taken.
Their views-even views central to their very being-are dis-
counted or disregarded. Furthermore, it would seem that the
potential for acrimony and political strife would be intensified
with each such taking or taxing.
Each of these preceding problems, however, is moderated
in some measure under the two remaining nonpreference theo-
ries: nonpreference as to conscience and nonpreference
between religion and nonreligion.
2. Nonpreference as to Matters of Conscience
The nonpreference as to matters of conscience view, the
view that government may accommodate religion when it does
so in a manner that does not prefer one form of exercise of
conscience over another, is less likely to restrict the liberty of
minority religionists. This is so because "conscience" is suffi-
ciently over-inclusive as a term, and thus would include less
conventional religions within its ambit. Such a view may well
have its precedential foundation in Justice Harlan's concurring
opinion in the Welsh case,88 a case in which the Court read a
statutory reference to "religion" to include "conscience" in
determining who may be included in the conscientious objector
category for draft exemption purposes. Justice Harlan went
further than the majority and asserted that the establishment
clause itself required such a broader reading. 9 For Justice
88. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
89. In Welsh, Justice Harlan asserted that,
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Harlan, the establishment clause mandates accommodation
based on conscience not merely on the basis of religion.
Such a broader reading of the category of those forms of
exercise, expression and association that must be included in a
nonlreferential theory has the virtue of creating fewer outsid-
ers than the nonpreference as to religion view and of being
more meaningful and less broad than the theory that religion
and nonreligion must be treated nonpreferentially, in a defini-
tional sense. As such, the nonpreference as to conscience view
has many of the virtues and fewer of the vices of the nonprefer-
ence as to religion view. It would increase religious liberty by
accommodating it, even in the public sector, in an expansive
manner. In doing so, it would limit the capacity of government
to show preference for one form of religious exercise or exer-
cise of conscience over another. However, it potentially
presents problems that are not present under the nonprefer-
ence as to religion view. First, it creates an equilibrium prob-
lem; since application of such a doctrine would expand the area
in which government could accommodate religion, it could
arguably increase the extent to which government could regu-
late free exercise of religion. Second, it could create disincen-
tives for elected governmental officials to accommodate
religion, because it would widen the class of recipients of such
aid or accommodation.
There is a response to each of these objections, however.
The equilibrium objection, or the notion that the state may
expand its regulatory authority to the same degree that it
accommodates a right of conscience for establishment pur-
poses, is countered by noting that if the free exercise right were
expanded to include a wider right of conscience, together with
the establishment clause, the government could be limited in
its efforts to expand its regulatory domain as to matters of con-
science. Such a limitation on regulatory authority would, at
least theoretically, expand rather than contract the free exer-
cise right. In other words, rather than maintaining a constant
equilibrium in terms of the combined amount of exercise and
accommodation that may exist in our system at any point in
time, a broader definition could expand both exercise and
accommodation, thereby increasing religious liberty as a whole.
having chosen to exempt, [Congress] cannot draw the line between
theistic and nontheistic religious beliefs on the one hand and secular
beliefs on the other. Any such distinctions are not, in my view
compatible with the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
Id. at 356. For a discussion of Harlan's opinion, see Dorsen, supra note 73, at
869-71.
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One is therefore left to inquire whether, as a practical mat-
ter, such expansion of the free exercise right under the broader
matters of "conscience" view would increase the likelihood that
government officials would decline to accommodate such exer-
cise, by invoking the establishment clause or simply by refusing
to legislate such broad accommodation. It might be argued, in
this regard, that government officials would be disinclined to
expand a free exercise or related right, if they had to include a
broader class of recipients for establishment purposes. It is
perhaps likely that they would be less inclined to accommodate
such a larger class, but if that were the case, it may merely evi-
dence the propensity of government officials to support only
recipients that they find themselves in agreement with or who
constitute a significant electoral constituency. As such, their
refusal to offer such accommodation may constitute evidence
of an underlying desire to act preferentially in this sensitive
area. If that is the case, restraint is preferable to a thinly veiled
preference, particularly in a system that values protecting the
liberty of minorities and the unpopular. Relatedly, even if, in
fact, the equilibrium argument carries any weight, such accom-
modationist restraint in the establishment context might widen
the ambit of the free exercise clause, because as accommoda-
tion of majority religions decreases, infringement on free exer-
cise might also decrease.90
A more significant problem arises, however, with regard to
implementing a nonpreference as to matters of conscience the-
ory. That problem centers on the fact that the term "con-
science" is broader than "religion," and thus more uncertain.
Who, for example, would be entitled to nonpreference, or, put
otherwise, equal treatment, under a legislative or statutory
accommodation of "conscience"? Would a tax exemption stat-
ute have to be applied so broadly that it would include an
almost limitless number of organizations and individuals? If
not, how would one limit the concept "conscience," and would
such a lihitation invite discrimination? Finally, would a "con-
90. If Dallin Oaks and others are correct in asserting that the
broadening of accommodation or exemptions under the establishment clause
has the effect of limiting free exercise, then a nonpreferentialism as to
matters of conscience reading of the establishment clause might broaden free
exercise, because fewer legislative accommodations would occur or would be
permitted. As I have asserted previously, I doubt such an equilibrium theory,
but even if it is an accurate description of reality in the political context, the
worst that can be said is that as accommodations under the establishment
clause are limited (by a broad reading of conscience), free exercise rights may
be expanded.
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science" theory require a closer examination of the sincerity of
one's views than a nonpreference as to "religion" view?
Analyses of "sincerity" invite extensive discretion by the
decisionmaker. Inquiries regarding "sincerity" may be less
important or necessary where one merely relies on a definition
of religion that is based on conventional indicia of what consti-
tutes a "religion," without getting into issues of sincerity.
However, the trade-off between the nonpreference as to con-
science and the nonpreference as to religion theories in this
regard is two-sided: on the one hand, conscience is more inclu-
sive and therefore potentially less discriminatory than the "reli-
gion" view; on the other hand, nonpreference as to religion
may demand less evaluation regarding sincerity. In the trade-
off, it would seem that the nonpreference as to conscience side
has the better of the argument. The nonpreference as to con-
science view has less likelihood of being used in a discrimina-
tory manner, because the term "conscience" is more inclusive
than the term "religion." Furthermore, even to the extent that
sincerity becomes an issue, it is preferable to combine nondis-
crimination or less discrimination with a sincerity analysis than
to combine the added potential for discrimination inherent in
defining "religion" with a refusal to analyze sincerity. How-
ever, I would acknowledge that this may be less true where
sincerity is a fact issue, and subject to the flights of fancy and
discriminatory potential of a jury, and the issue of what is a
"religion" remains a question of law, left for the judiciary and
elaboration by rule of law. As such, I would suggest that the
issue of sincerity, at a minimum, be treated as a mixed issue of
fact and law. If this were the case, a party would be able to
have, so to speak, two bites at the sincerity apple, persuading
either the jury or the judge that their views were sincerely
held.9 At any rate, decisionmakers at all levels should be sen-
sitive to the potential for abuse inherent in a sincerity analysis.
However, while the nonpreference as to conscience view
limits the discrimination problem inherent in the nonprefer-
ence as to religion view, the proponents of the nonpreference
between religion and nonreligion view would argue that their
view entirely eliminates the potential for discrimination that is
present in differing degrees in both of the other nonpreference
views, as well as the need for a sincerity analysis. There simply
is no need to evaluate sincerity when the class is widened to
include both religion and nonreligion for accommodation pur-
91. For a thoughtful discussion of this and related issues, see L. TRIBE,
supra note 57, at 1181-88.
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poses. Given this fact, absent other debilitating problems, it
would seem that the nonpreference as to religion and nonreli-
gion view is a more promising theoretical. candidate in terms of
maximizing liberty than are either of the other nonpreferential-
ist views.
3. Nonpreference Between Religion and Nonreligion
In addition to avoiding the problems of discrimination and
the need for a sincerity analysis inherent in both of the other
nonpreference views, there are other justifications for the non-
preference between religion and nonreligion view. Foremost
among these is the fact that such a view seemingly protects the
liberty of outsiders and minorities more extensively than other
views, without placing religion at a disadvantage vis-a-vis
nonreligion. Professor Dorsen made this point when he
asserted:
[T]he core purpose of the religion clauses applies to
nonbelievers as well as to believers. The key objective in
both situations is to safeguard minorities and outsiders
with respect to religious beliefs-an obligation consonant
with the overriding goal of the Bill of Rights to protect
vulnerable groups in American society, thereby assuring
that there are no outsiders in our polity.9"
Arguing for a similar view, Professor Conkle recently elabo-
rated on this point, noting that:
[A]n identification with the American political community
"comes easily, even automatically," for most American
citizens. By contrast, "identification with America is a
choice that entails costs" for members of cultural minori-
ties, including religious minorities. This suggests that in
the issuance of religious or irreligious messages, the
political community should not be overly concerned with
the effect of these messages on those who are part of
America's religious mainstream. The community ties of
these citizens tend to be strong already, as well as resili-
ent. Attention should be focused instead on those who
stand closer to the edge of society, those who hold
unconventional views that may make them reluctant to
attach themselves to the American political community.
The community bond of these individuals is more likely
to be weak and malleable. Thus, messages of embrace-
92. Dorsen, supra note 73, at 868.
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ment may significantly strengthen their community bond;
messages of exclusion may destroy it altogether.
9 3
Proponents of the nonpreference between religion and nonre-
ligion view contend that their view is optimal in terms of secur-
ing liberty to outsiders and minorities, because it forbids
distinctions based on conscience or religion, thereby widening
the class of nonpreference to all groups and individuals, reli-
gious and nonreligious alike.
However, those espousing either a nonpreference as to
conscience or a nonpreference as to religion view could
respond that, even on Professor Conkle's own terms, the best
that can be said for the nonpreference between religion and
nonreligion view is that it eliminates particularized accommo-
dation for religion or conscience. While such a neutralization
of religion or conscience appears to eliminate the potential for
exclusion of some minorities or outsiders, it does little to
"strengthen their community bond" through "embracement"
or accommodation. Furthermore, the nonpreference between
religion and nonreligion view may not even succeed in its goal
of avoiding a sense of exclusion from the polity on the part of
religious and nonreligious minorities. If "nonreligion" is read
broadly and inclusively, it has the effect of simply eliminating
both legislative and judicial exemptions on religious or matters
of conscience grounds. In effect, it emphasizes a secular state,
and would apply all general legislative regulations in an even-
handed manner, refusing to provide for exemptions. If all reli-
gious and nonreligious groups were to be exempted from a
given legislative act, the act itself would be without force or
effect. In other words, everyone could be exempted from the
act, if any one was, and thus, no exemptions or accommoda-
tions could be made. Furthermore, given that such general
laws or regulations would be promulgated by the majority in
the polity, and applied to everyone (minority and majority
alike), it would not be surprising to find that such general laws
were particularly pernicious in terms of their potential for insti-
tutional coercion of minorities. Since it is unimaginable that all
religious influence could be eliminated from the political pro-
cess, given the subtle and sometimes subconscious influence of
religion or conscience on our actions, it would simply be
impossible to purge the public sector and the legislative pro-
cess of all such influence. Under the nonpreference as to reli-
gion or nonreligion view, it might also be impossible to exempt
93. Conkle, Toward a General Theoy of the Establishment Clause, 82 Nw.
U.L. REV. 1113, 1178 (1988).
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minority religionists or groups from a general law or regulation
even if it were possible to discover such subtle religious influ-
ences or motives in the legislative process, because to create
such an exemption would be to prefer a religion, albeit a
minority one. The entire legislative scheme or program would
have to be eliminated. Such massive elimination of legislative
programs on the ground that they were in part religiously moti-
vated might well subject the judiciary to the wrath of the other
branches of government and might, in the process, first isolate
and later render the judiciary wholly ineffectual.
Perhaps, however, the nonpreference as to religion and
nonreligion view could be rehabilitated in this area by simply
permitting minority religions and nonreligions to be exempted
from laws and regulations promulgated under a democratic
process naturally tainted by majoritarian religious influences.
Such an effort at rehabilitation is subject to three objections:
(1) the influence of religion or similar matters on the legislative
process is arguably both subtle and pervasive and, as such, is
hardly susceptible to management by exemption; (2) ascertain-
ing which groups are minorities for such purposes would not
be an easy task, unless one simply excluded all those who did
not agree with the legislation or regulation or who refused to
support it; and (3) given the transitory nature of minorities in
our pluralistic society, such exemptions would be of little prec-
edential weight, at least with regard to particular minorities,
and would require case-by-case analysis, with all the transaction
costs that would be incurred as a result of such an ad hoc
process.
Additionally, the nonpreference as to religion and nonreli-
gion view falls prey to many of the same objections that can be
leveled against the strict separationist view. The nonprefer-
ence between religion and nonreligion view does little to pro-
mote religious association as an element of religious liberty,
because it would not recognize exemptions from general legis-
lation of the sort mandated in the Amos case. Exempting a reli-
gious association from general legislation, regardless of the
intensity of the religious group's opposition to such regulation,
would not be permitted, unless nonreligious groups were simi-
larly exempted. Such a broad exemption would, as I noted ear-
lier, render the legislation impotent. Religious exercise or free
exercise as to matters of conscience could not be exempted
either, and such exercise would be greatly circumscribed with
the growth of the regulatory state. Arguably, religious expres-
sion could be salvaged by simply recognizing an open forum
that equally respected all viewpoints. However, such a conclu-
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sion would be hard to sustain, particularly in light of the cur-
rent state of first amendment free expression law, which treats
various categories of speech (e.g., commercial speech, defama-
tory speech, obscene or indecent speech, etc.) in significantly
different ways. First amendment scholars argue that such cate-
gorization is necessary to protect the core of free speech and
expression from a doctrinal weakening that would occur if such
categories were jettisoned in favor of a single doctrinal formu-
lation. 94 The most that could be said, therefore, is that such
categories of speech could not be made on grounds which dis-
criminate between religion and nonreligion.
In summary, while upon cursory reflection, the nonprefer-
ence between religion and nonreligion view seems capable of
limiting the discrimination in application and sincerity analysis
problems inherent in the other nonpreference views, its very
generality renders it ineffectual. Thus, in this less than perfect
doctrinal world we live in, the nonpreference as to matters of
conscience view seems to be preferable in that it moderates
both the strengths and weaknesses of the other two nonprefer-
ence views, although some amalgam of the three views may
also be viable and may maximize liberty on a case-by-case
basis. 95
III. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In the first part of this article, I discussed my theory of
originalism, a theory that takes both the intentions and the
aspirations of the framers and ratifiers of the first amendment
seriously. In that portion of the article, I generally challenged
conventional theories of originalism on their own historical
grounds, and then sought to articulate my own theory.
In applying my theory of constitutional interpretation to
the establishment clause of the first amendment, I summarized
conclusions that I have reached elsewhere, to the effect that
94. See, e.g., BeVieu, The Free Exercise Clause: A View From the Public Forum,
27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 963 (1986).
95. The problem with creating a doctrinal framework based on an
amalgam of the nonpreferential views is that such a framework would be less
clear and more ad hoc in its application. Doctrinal incoherence of this sort
may well contribute to increased discrimination because it affords the court
too much discretion in deciding which nonpreferential theory applies in a
given case and because uncertainty increases the cost of vindicating rights. If
one is uncertain as to whether or not her alleged right will be legally
recognized, then it is more likely that she will have to litigate. Litigation is
costly and may not even be possible for those who lack the time or resources
to pursue it.
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there were two legitimate substantive theories that can be
derived from an originalist analysis of the history-the Madis-
onian and Story views. In this article, after summarizing those
prior findings, I addressed the task of determining which view
should prevail.
Determining which view should prevail as a matter of con-
stitutional interpretation requires imposition of a second the-
ory of constitutional analysis on the material or viewpoints
disclosed by an originalist analysis. No originalist theory can
avoid the necessity of imposing a second theory of judicial
review on an historical record that is often both ambiguous and
reflective of legislative compromise. Such compromises some-
times provided for intentional ambiguity to mask disagree-
ment, leaving resolution of existing disagreements to future
"discussions and adjudications. '"96 At the same time, they also
served as a sufficiently broad basis for the expansion of the
framers' and ratifiers' aspiration toward liberty and other con-
stitutional values.
Most contemporary originalists impose a secondary theory
of deference to majoritarian institutions of government in the
face of an incomplete and ambiguous originalist record. In my
view, such a theory is inconsistent with the libertarian aspira-
tions of the framers and ratifiers, who were actuated in major
part by a fear of tyranny, an important form of which was the
tyranny of the majority as expressed in the workings of demo-
cratic institutions of government. Believing as I do in the liber-
tarian aspirations of the framers, I seek to determine which
position disclosed by an originalist analysis best maximizes reli-
gious liberty. Such a secondary theory is in keeping with both
the intentions and aspirations of the framers and ratifiers of the
Bill of Rights.
Before examining the various theoretical underpinnings
that have been proffered for establishment clause analysis, I
briefly examined each of the elements of religious liberty-the
free exercise, free expression and free association aspects of
such liberty. I then turned to an examination of the views pro-
pounded in originalist accounts of the history of the establish-
ment clause and in the cases and commentary. These included:
the view that government may establish a religion (a view that
virtually everyone concedes was outside the intent of the fram-
ers and ratifiers of the first amendment, at least with regard to
the power of the national government); the view summarized
96. Again I utilize a phrase from Madison. See supra note 4 and
accompanying text.
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by Justice Story in his Commentaries to the Constitution that govern-
ment may prefer nondenominational Christianity, provided it
does so in a tolerant manner; the three nonpreferentialist
views-nonpreference as to religion, nonpreference as to mat-
ters of conscience, and nonpreference between religion and
nonreligion; and the strict separationist view (a view which, in
its extreme form of advocating irreligion in the public sector,
was also outside the intent of the framers and ratifiers). Upon
examining each of these theories for the purpose of ascertain-
ing which of them best maximizes religious liberty, I tentatively
concluded that the nonpreference theories are preferable. In
selecting from among the three nonpreferential views, I noted
that each has its respective strengths and weaknesses, but I
generally concluded that nonpreference as to matters of con-
science is preferable.
Throughout the article, I have recognized the limitations
that necessarily attend such analysis. I am painfully aware of
the hermeneutical and semantic insights that have pervaded
contemporary legal literature and have aided in the decon-
struction of constitutional doctrine. However, I hope that in
some manner I have given the concept of religious liberty addi-
tional meaning, because I firmly believe it is susceptible of a
sufficient level of doctrinal determinacy. Relatedly, and finally,
I hope that in the future analysis of both the establishment and
free exercise clauses will focus a bit more on the liberty-maxi-
mizing potential of underlying theories. Such an effort would
be an apt means of celebrating the upcoming bicentennial of
the Bill of Rights and of furthering the aspirations of the fram-
ers and ratifiers of the first amendment.
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